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WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR? WAR POWER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION
J. RICHARD BROUGHTON*
L Introduction
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that in America all political questions
ultimately become judicial questions. The effect of this phenomenon, he
observed, is that the American constitutional system invests American courts with
significant political power, but a power that is nonetheless mitigated by the use
of judicial, rather than political, procedures.2 For Tocqueville, then, this power
of judicial review "is.. . one of the most powerful barriers ever erected against
the tyranny of political assemblies."3 Still, Tocqueville conceded that judicial
review "cannot cover all laws without exception, for there are some laws which
can never give rise to that sort of clearly formulated argument called a lawsuit."4
Such circumstances therefore serve to limit the courts' power to attack the
constitutionality of the laws, thereby restricting their ability to venture beyond the
judicial sphere and exercise powers committed properly and constitutionally to the
political branches.
The Framers recognized these limitations, too. They approved a constitutional
text that limited the judiciary's province to "cases" and "controversies," and
explicitly delineated the specific types of matters to which the federal judicial
power extends.' And both Publius6 and the Philadelphia Convention delegates
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I am truly grateful to my wife, Avelyn, for her continuing support.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer
ed., Harper Perennial Books 1969) (1840).
2. Id. at 102.
3. Id. at 104.
4. Id. at 103.
5. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("TIThe
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."); id. at 466 (describing the
importance of an independence in limiting the judiciary's power); id. at 469 ("The courts must declare
the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 480-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing limits on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Ihe judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the Constitution
to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those cases marks the precise limits
beyond which the federal courts cannot exercise theirjurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance
being enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive
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carefully described the delicate and circumscribed role of the courts in the federal
system. Madison, for example, responded to a proposal to extend judicial power
to all cases arising under the Constitution by contemplating
whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court
generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought
not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expoun-
ding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not be given to
that Department.!
Madison, moreover, explained that the political branches themselves have a
significant role to play in deliberating upon, and deciding, the meaning of
constitutional provisions. He argued, during a debate concerning presidential
removal power, that
[t]he great objection drawn from the source to which the last ar-
guments would lead us is, that the Legislature itself has no right to
expound the Constitution; that wherever its meaning is doubtful, you
must leave it to take its course, until the Judiciary is called upon to
declare its meaning. I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of
Government, that the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves
upon the Judiciary. But I beg to know, upon what principle it can be
contended, that any one department draws from the Constitution
greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers
of the several departments? The Constitution is the charter of the
people to the Government; it specifies certain great powers as
absolutely granted, and marks out the departments to exercise them.
If the Constitutional boundary of either be brought into question, I do
not see that any one of these independent departments has more right
than another to declare their sentiments on that point.'
authority.").
For a recent, comprehensive account of Hamilton's influence on constitutional law, see David
McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85
MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001).
7. See The Federal Convention of 1787, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 120-24 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). On July 21, 1787, the
delegates considered a motion to associate the judiciary with the executive branch. Id. at 120. During
the debate, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts stated the importance of keeping the power of making law
"distinct from that of expounding, the laws.... The Judges in exercising the function of expositors might
be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing the laws." ld. at 122. Luther Martin of Maryland
cautioned that "lilt is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the confidence of the people.
This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating against popular measures of the
Legislature." Id. at 123.
8. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENT1ON OF 1787, at 430 (Max Fan-and ed., 1966) (emphasis
added).
9. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison); see also J.
Richard Broughton, Boeme Down the House: The Religious Liberty Protection Act and the Separation
of Powers, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 317, 321 [hereinafter Broughton, Boeme Down the House]
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Marshall, too, recognized this limitation in an early speech as a House member,
arguing that "[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the
constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion
and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States
it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could act.""
Marshall continued, "[T]he division of power ... could exist no longer, and the
other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary."" Thus, the power
of judicial review is limited not simply by the Constitution's textual requirement
of "cases and controversies," but also by prudence, reflected in the text, that both
restrains the judiciary and empowers the political branches as the instruments of
popular will." This view, captured most eloquently in Madison's and Marshall's
statements, therefore recognizes two concepts: first, that some constitutional
controversies are ill-suited to judicial resolution (the performance of which would
upset the constitutional balance and separation of powers), a recognition that
today informs our law of justiciability in federal courts; 3 and second, that both
(describing Madison's position on congressional constitutional deliberation and concluding that the only
limitation upon Congress's role in expounding upon the Constitution is that Congress cannot exercise
judicial power in a case or controversy, nor can it deprive the judiciary of complete control over judicial
functions).
10. John Marshall, Speech to the House of Representatives of March 7, 1800, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL at 95 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998).
11. Id. This statement anticipated the explicit limits on judicial review that Marshall outlined in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
12. See Orrin G. Hatch, Modem Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 891, 894 (1989) ("It is clear
that James Madison intended the 'case or controversy' requirement to limit the Supreme Court to 'cases
of a judiciary nature' as opposed to cases susceptible to political resolution or cases without concrete
injuries to specific parties."); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1576, at 381 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1873) (1833) (explaining the limited powers of
the judiciary). As Justice Story explains, "mhe judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of the
acts and laws of the general and State governments, so far as they are capable of being made the subject
of judicial controversy." Id. (emphasis added).
13. See 2 STORY, supra note 12, § 1576, at 381. These doctrines, which have grown out of the
"ease or controversy" requirement and the separation of powers, include standing, ripeness, mootness,
the prohibition on advisory opinions, the political question doctrine, and jurisdiction. See, e.g., Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998) (stating that "mootness ... deprives us of our power to act; there is
nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so"); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725, 733 n.7 (1997) (holding that the '"ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III
limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction"') (quoting
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (requiring plaintiffs to allege a personal injury that is particularized, concrete, and
otherwise judicially cognizable, and explaining that "the core component of standing is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article IIr'); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361,
363 (1987) (holding that "Article Ill of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy
at the time a federal court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been a live case or
controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing") (emphasis
added); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751-52 (1984) (stating that Article III courts lackjurisdiction over
a suit unless the plaintiff has suffered "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief' and that "the law of Art. IlI standing
is built on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
2001]
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Congress and the President play an important role in determining the
Constitution's meaning when deliberating upon various matters of federal law,
particularly those matters that are ultimately beyond the judicial ken."
Constitutional war power is one such matter, and the War Powers Resolution
of 1973" is the law that most clearly demonstrates this point. Passed amid the
political turbulence that marked the Vietnam Era,' and over President Nixon's
486, 518 (1969) (stating that "federal courts will not adjudicate political questions."); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (holding that "no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek
adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the
question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no
standing to maintain the action."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the political
question doctrine and its roots in the separation of powers); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890-99
(1983) (arguing that the standing doctrine serves important structural purposes).
14. See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 214-218 (1990) (arguing that "the status of the Supreme Court as sole
expositor of the Constitution has not been universally accepted" and giving examples); Louis Fisher,
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 718 (1985) (explaining that
being the "ultimate interpreter" is different from being the "exclusive interpreter" of the Constitution and
that "[r]eforms of recent decades also have increased the capability of members to participate in
constitutional debate and to honor their commitment to support the Constitution"); Scott E. Gant, Judicial
Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 359, 421
(1997) (expressing the "desire to have Congress engage in more systematic and thoughtful debate about
the bearing of the Constitution on their work as legislators"); Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The Framers'
Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REV. 217, 218 (1986) ("The
Framers' . . understanding of representation included serious scrutiny of the Constitution.").
For a more recent and quite compelling account of legislative branch constitutional deliberation, see
Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE LJ. 1335 (2001). Professor
Katyal offers a detailed analysis of constitutional supremacy and offers a number of suggestions to
Congress for playing a more influential role in the process of making and interpreting the law. Id.
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2001). The literature on the War Powers Resolution is vast, with most
of the debate focusing upon the constitutional allocation of war powers and the Resolution's implications
for making and conducting foreign policy. For some good examples of the literature, see Eileen Burgin,
Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the Persian Gulf War, 21 J. LEGIS. 23
(1995); Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101
(1984); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLuM. L. REV.
1379 (1988); J. Terry Emerson, The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense
Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187 (1975); Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War
Powers Resolution, 50J. MIAMI L. REV. 17 (1995); Louis Henkin, War Powers "Short of War," 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 201 (If95); Bennett C. Rushkoff, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J.
1330 (1984). The purpose of this article is not to revisit the debate over the propriety of the Resolution,
as others more knowledgeable and capable have done so repeatedly. Rather, the purpose here is to treat
an aspect of the war powers debate that has seldom received substantial attention: the judiciary's role in
cases involving disputes about the allocation of constitutional war power.
16. Compare 134 CONG. REC. E3559 (1988) (statement of Rep. Broomfield) (stating the Resolution
"was intended to address the issues resulting from the entanglement of U.S. Armed Forces in the
Indochinese Conflict"), with Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 128 (1995) (explaining that "it
is tempting to view [the Resolution] solely as a response to the Vietnam War... The resolution is better
described as a slow, evolutionary culmination of institutional struggles and constitutional debate than as
a narrow preoccupation with the Vietnam War.").
(Vol. 54:685
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constitutionally based veto, the War Powers Resolution was Congress's effort
to assert its powers pursuant to the Declare War Clause of Article I, Section 8S
The statute requires the "collective judgment" of the political branches before
American troops are sent into hostilities;'9 requires that if the President commits
troops into hostilities, he must inform Congress within forty-eight hours and
remove them within sixty days absent congressional approval (although the
President may extend the period for thirty additional days to protect and remove
the troops);" and requires the President to report to Congress throughout the
period and consult with Congress before taking action."
Since its enactment, no President has explicitly approved of the War Powers
Resolution and all have disputed its constitutionality in light of the Commander
in Chief Clause.' Furthermore, while some members of Congress over the past
three decades have insisted upon its usefulness and argued for presidential
adherence,' many others have rejected it as unworkable or unconstitutional,'
and many have simply ignored it in times of military involvement. Indeed,
For a remarkable analysis of the Vietnam Era and its impact on American constitutional law, see JOHN
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993).
17. See Richard Nixon, in 1973 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS § 311, at 893 (communicating
to Congress the veto of the War Powers Resolution and arguing that the "only way in which the
constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution
and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force").
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2001).
20. Id. §§ 1543(a), 1544(b).
21. Id. §§ 1543-1544.
22. See ELY, supra note 16, at 49-52 (giving examples of President Reagan's and President Bush's
rejections of the Resolution); Jonathan A. Bush, The Binding of Gulliver: Congress and Courts in an Era
of Presidential Warmaking, 80 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1747 (1994) (reviewing ELY, supra note 16, and
stating, "Every President since 1973 has insisted that the Resolution impinged on his constitutional
prerogatives and has treated the Resolution with institutional contempt.").
23. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H1901 (1993) (statement of Rep. Gonzales) (stating that it is
Congress's duty "to uphold the law of the land and the War Powers Resolution is the law of the land");
138 CONG. REc. E3135 (1992) (statement of Rep. Fascell) ("The War Powers Resolution is in perfect
working order."); 136 CoNG. REc. S13,481 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("I want to be on the
record here today saying that I will continue to call for full implementation of both the spirit and the
letter of the War Powers Resolution."); 134 CONG. REc. E3741 (1988) (statement of Rep. Fascell)
("mhe War Powers Resolution remains a worthy vehicle for this coparticipation in the warmaking
process. It is a living document whose importance in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy cannot be
dismissed, discounted, or denied.").
24. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. H1262 (1998) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("The War Powers
Act [sic] has never been utilized; and frankly, I think the irony of this vote may send it to the courts and
the courts rule it unconstitutional."); 141 CoNG. REC. S18,681 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn) ("I voted
for the War Powers Resolution. I wish now I had not because it will never work. It is not sensible.");
140 CONG. REC. S13,002 (1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (criticizing the Resolution as unworkable
and flawed and stating, "I do not think ... the War Powers Resolution is consistent with either the intent
of the Framers of our Constitution or with most Presidential practice prior to the cold war. So we must
do better."); 134 CONG. REC. S6173 (1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("[T]he War Powers Resolution,
as presently written, is unworkable and needs to be changed.").
20011
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Congress has repeatedly acquiesced in presidential decision making regarding the
use of American troops in hostilities around the globe.' A few attempts have
even been made in Congress to repeal the Resolution,' 6 but those attempts have
thus far failed. More importantly, few serious debates concerning its
constitutionality have ensued between members of Congress or between the
political branches since its passage. Rather, challengers have often resorted to the
courts, using both the Resolution and the War Powers Clause as vehicles, in
hopes that the judiciary would resolve the question of whether a particular
presidential action violated the statute and the Constitution (thus implicating, at
least as a background matter, the constitutionality of the Resolution itself)." This
most recently occurred in a hardly recognized but crucial case, Campbell v.
Clinton," involving President Clinton's use of airstrikes in Kosovo. Indeed, many
prominent episodes of presidential military deployment in recent years have
prompted lawsuits designed to invoke a judicial determination concerning the
applicability of the War Powers Resolution and the constitutional allocation of
foreign affairs powers.29
Historically, and especially in the Vietnam and post-Vietnam eras, the courts
have largely demurred in deciding war powers questions." As this article
explains, courts have compelling reasons for doing so that serve our constitutional
structure of separate and distinct powers.3 First and foremost, the text of the
25. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. E1984 (1993) (statement of Rep. Gilman) (explaining Congress's
refusal to invoke the War Powers Resolution after President Clinton's deployment of troops in Somalia);
134 CONG. REC. E3559 (1988) (statement of Rep. Broomfield) (explaining Congress's refusal to invoke
the War Powers Resolution during President Reagan's use of force in the Persian Gulf).
26. See, e.g., S. 5, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 7, 104th Cong. (1995).
27. See Abner J. Mikva, The Political Question Revisited: War Powers and the 'Zone of Twilight,"
76 KY. L.J. 329, 335 (1987) (stating that "[tlhe disputes over the Vietnam War left a second important
legacy in the war powers area: the lawsuit, often filed with at least one Congressman as a plaintiff,
asking the courts to intervene in limiting a President's use of the war power").
28. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinzo v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (challenging President
Reagan's support of the Nicaraguan Contras); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990)
(challenging President Bush's deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf after Iraq invaded Kuwait);
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (challenging President Reagan's support of the
government of El Salvador as a violation of the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause).
30. See Bush, supra note 22, at 1753 ("[N]o one can say that the courts have not made exceedingly
clear their distaste for judging the constitutionality of an ongoing or imminent war."); Entin, supra note
14, at 177 ("[T]he judiciary has served as a bystander throughout the controversy over the War Powers
Resolution."); Mikva, supra note 27, at 336 ("Over the years, the political question doctrine has had
particular resiliency in cases involving foreign policy."). But see Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential
War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REv. 180 (1998) (contending that history
proves that courts have already been continuously engaged in deciding war and foreign affairs questions
and have not proven reluctant to do so and that their reluctance has been limited to specific legal
questions or based on specific legal difficulties, such as standing or mootness problems).
31. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. Admittedly, much of the literature on this question
(sparse though it is) is contrary. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 16, at 54-67 (arguing that courts should
decide war powers cases on the merits and remand the matter to Congress, thus, as Dean Ely puts it,
inducing Congress to do its job); Bush, supra note 22, at 1754 (agreeing with Dean Ely that the courts
[Vol. 54:685
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Constitution commits decisions about the conduct of war and of foreign, military,
and diplomatic affairs to the political branches, thus implicating the constitutional-
ly proper and prudent political question doctrine. 2 Second, in particular cases,
other existing constitutional doctrines of justiciability may preclude judicial
intervention.33 That is, many war powers cases are brought by improper litigants
to the suit, are brought by litigants with an insufficient stake in the matter, or
contain questions too abstract or hypothetical; thus, these cases lend themselves
to resolution that comes either prematurely or too late. Finally, the premise of
many such lawsuits - that resort must be had to the courts as an alternative to
political branch inaction or as a' remedy for deadlock in the political
branches34 - is itself troubling. It ignores not merely the Constitution's
commitment of such matters to the political branches alone, but it also under-
mines constitutional deliberation in the political branches by encouraging political
actors to wait comfortably on the constitutional sidelines while the judiciary plays
the game.
This article thus addresses this crucial issue regarding judicial review of
constitutional war powers disputes, an issue that has been, with a few notable and
important exceptions, placed largely on the back burner of the extensive legal
have compiled a "sorry record" of avoiding decisions in war powers disputes); Corn, supra note 30, at
181 (stating that "under the right circumstances a war power controversy between the President and
Congress may necessitate judicial resolution"); cf. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY
CONSTrrtON 181-84 (1990) (advocating a limited judicial role and concluding that Congress should
adopt a statute authorizing such suits by concerned citizens acting as private attorneys general or
members of Congress); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 114-15 (1991) (arguing that,
although the determination of whether war exists is justiciable, courts will have difficulty in fashioning
an appropriate remedy and must also contend with doctrines of ripeness and mootness that will "foreclose
the possibility, at any time, of the judiciary's competent monitoring and enforcement of an injunction
against the President's use of offensive military force").
32. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Baker explains that a political question is one
involving
a textually demonstrable Constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id.; see also John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 288 (1996) (explaining that "[h]aving placed war powers in the
arena of politics, the Framers would have viewed inter-branch disputes in the area as unsuitable for
judicial resolution"). Professor Yoo's work on this subject (as on others) is compelling and persuasive,
and this article relies upon much of Yoo's work.
33. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won't Resolve the War
Powers Debate, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1305, 1307-13 (1997) (explaining that "there are various
procedural and jurisdictional obstacles to litigating over war powers and foreign affairs").
34. See ELY, supra note 16, at 56 (arguing that, although courts should not be in the habit of
dictating American war making, they should "be enlisted in inducing Congress to answer" questions
regarding the allocation of war powers).
20011
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scholarship in the war powers arena. Part 11 explores the various important cases
that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have decided that are relevant
to war powers and foreign affairs disputes. Part III gives particular attention to
Campbell, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit last year but rejected on certiorari by the Supreme Court, which
provides an important piece in the wall separating the courts from war powers
controversies. Finally, Part IV concludes that, based on constitutional text,
structure, history, and precedent, the courts would do well to remain disengaged
in this area. Indeed, leaving this dispute to the political branches serves two
important values that Madison recognized: First, it best preserves the
constitutional order of separated powers by leaving questions about the give and
take of foreign affairs, war, and diplomacy to those uniquely situated (and most
competent) to address them; and second, it encourages the President and Congress
to fulfill their important public duties to deliberate seriously about constitutional
powers.
IL Judicial Review in Foreign and Military Affairs: A Historical Perspective
The Constitution states that Congress "shall have Power to ... declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water."3 It also empowers Congress to
raise and support Armies . . . To provide and maintain a Navy; To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress.36
The Constitution also states, however, that the President "shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into actual Service of the United States.' 37 In
addition, the Constitution vests in the President the authority to make treaties
(with Senate advice and consent) and appoint ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls. 8 The cases analyzed in this section implicate the tension between
these institutional powers and serve as exemplars of the role the judiciary has
played in many of our nation's most significant foreign affairs controversies.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
38. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
[Vol. 54:685
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A. Early Cases: The French and the Rebels
Not long after the adoption of the new Constitution, the Republic faced its first
critical military and diplomatic decision, a decision that ultimately implicated
these apparently conflicting clauses concerning the scope of foreign relations
authority in each of the political branches. In 1793, President Washington
declared American neutrality in the war between France and England, provoking
debate - including the famed Pacificus-Helvidius debate between Hamilton and
Madison" - as to whether the President could do so without congressional
approval.' Prior to his action, though, President Washington, through a letter
from Secretary of State Jefferson, asked the Supreme Court to intervene and
render an opinion on the separation of powers issues that the neutrality
controversy implicated!' The Supreme Court declined the President's request,
thus beginning a custom of refusing to render advisory opinions or decide merely
abstract questions of law. 2 In addition, the letter from Chief Justice Jay and his
colleagues had the practical effect of leaving decisions about the propriety of
39. See Alexander Hamilton, The First Letter of "Pacificus," in THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY
53 (Robert S. Hirschfield ed., 3d ed. 1982). Hamilton contended that the executive branch had the power
to establish foreign policy and that the exercise of such power influenced congressional determinations
regarding the use of its war power. He stated that the power of effectuating foreign relations
must then of necessity belong to the executive department... when a proper case for it
occurs.
It appears to be connected with that department in various capacities: As the organ of
intercourse between the nation and foreign nations; as the interpreter of the national
treaties, in those cases in which the judiciary is not competent, that is, between
government and government; as the power, which is charged with the execution of the
laws, of which treaties form a part: as that which is charged with the command and
disposition of the public force.
Id. at 54.
Madison responded. See James Madison, The First Letter of "Helvidius," in THE POWER OF THE
PRESIDENCY, supra, at 59. Madison contended,
[l]t must be evident, that although the executive may be a convenient organ of preliminary
communications with foreign governments, on the subjects of treaty or war;, and the
proper agent for carrying into execution the final determinations of the competent
authority; yet it can have no pretensions, from the nature of the powers in question
compared with the nature of the executive trust, to that essential agency which gives
validity to such determinations. It must be further evident, that if these powers be not in
their nature purely legislative, they partake so much more of that, than of any other
quality, that under a Constitution leaving them to result to their most natural department,
the legislature would be without rival in its claim.
Id. at 61.
40. See ROBERT E. DICLERICO, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT 30 (3d ed. 1990); THE POWER OF THE
PRESIDENCY 46-47 (Robert S. Hirschfield ed., 3d ed. 1982).
41. See BERNARD SCHwART7, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 25 (1993).
42. See id. The Chief Justice's letter explained, "[Tihe lines of separation drawn by the Constitution
between the three departments of the government ... and our being judges of a court in the last resort,
are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding
the questions alluded to.'" Id
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unilateral presidential assertions of power in foreign affairs to the political
branches.43
In Bas v. Tingy," however, the Court took a more assertive role. Captain
Tingy of the U.S.S. Ganges sought statutorily authorized compensation after
recapturing an American merchant ship from the French. 5 One statute authorized
compensation for recapture of ships from the "French," while another authorized
higher compensation for recapture from an "enemy.' 6 The Court unanimously,
through separate opinions from each Justice, held that Tingy was entitled to the
higher amount because, although undeclared, a state of war existed between
France and the United States. Justice Washington explained that "hostilities may
subsist between two nations more confined in its nature and extent; being limited
as to places, persons, and things; and this is more properly termed imperfect
war."47 Justice Washington further concluded that France was an "enemy"
because a "contention by force" existed between it and the United States. '
Justice Chase agreed, explaining that while the war between the United States and
France was only a "partial" one absent a general declaration by Congress, it was
nevertheless "public" because "of the public authority from which it emanates.""9
Bas thus represents the Court's first major foray into the field of international
relations. Importantly, however, Bas involved an interpretation not of war powers
under the Constitution, but of a federal statute. The Bas Court offered no opinion
as to Congress's constitutional authority to adopt the statute, nor did it determine
whether a "war" existed in the constitutional sense of the term; rather, the Court
merely determined whether conditions existed to permit application of a particular
statutory scheme, a determination that bore directly on Captain Tingy's vested
rights.
In Talbot v. Seeman,"0 the U.S.S. Constitution's captain seized a merchant ship
flying a French flag on orders from President Jefferson. Upholding the legality
of the seizure, the Court concluded that Congress had the power to authorize the
seizure that justified the captain's move.' Congress, the Court said, "may
authorize general hostilities ... or partial hostilities." 2 Congress having done
so, the presidential order was appropriate to the commander in chief. Again,
though, Talbot did not referee an interbranch dispute as to who holds
constitutional war powers. It merely recognized what is obvious from the face of
the text: that Congress may declare war and thus Congress may choose how it
43. See id.
44. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
45. Id. at 37-38.
46. Id. at 39 (Moore, J.).
47. Id. at 40 (Washington, J.).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 43 (Chase, J.).
50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
51. Id. at 35 ("ITjhis power [of recapture) is supposed to exist as an incident growing out of the
state of war, and the right to salvage produced by that power is regulated in the act.").
52. Id. at 28.
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does so. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, "The whole powers of war being,
by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body
can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry." 3
The Court in Little v. Barreme4 ventured somewhat further into the war
powers morass. In this case, the owner of a Danish merchant ship sued a navy
captain who had seized the ship on orders from President Adams."5 The Court
ultimately found the captain liable for damages because Congress had specifically
limited the scope of the President's authority to seize vessels going from
American to French ports. 6 Here, however, President Adams ordered seizure of
a vessel sailing to or from France. Chief Justice Marshall, troubled by the
prospect of allowing military personnel to be held personally liable for following
orders from their commander in chief,57 nevertheless found that the President's
"instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which,
without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass."'" Significantly,
then, Little recognized Congress's ability to limit presidential, commander in chief
authority." Notably, though, the Court again was not called upon to determine
whether the seizure statute was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power
to declare war, nor was it called upon to decide the constitutionality of President
Adams' instructions. Rather, it was asked to determine whether liability would lie
given that Congress had already declared its position on national relations with
France in the form of the seizure statute.' President Adams' discretion, the
Court seemed to recognize, was exhausted once the statute went into effect, a
53. lad (emphasis added).
54. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
55. d at 176-77.
56. Il at 178.
57. Id at 179. Chief Justice Marshall in fact stated,
I confess the fist bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion that though
the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from
damages.... That implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of
their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared
to me to strongly imply the principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act,
ought to justify the person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by
the laws of his country in a situation which in general requires that he should obey
them.... But I have been convinced that I was mistaken ....
Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 16, at 19 (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall "admitted that the case
gave him much difficulty").
58. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
59. See ELY, supra note 16, at 55 (noting Little's significance as an example of judicial review of
war powers controversies); Coin, supra note 30, at 210 (stating that Little's "conclusion that Congress
is vested with the authority to set limitations on the conduct of military operations during an undeclared
war, limits not even the President may transgress, is undeniably significant").
60. Interestingly, Congress in 1807 passed a private bill to reimburse Captain Little for the damages
awarded against him, concluding that he should not have been held liable for following a presidential
directive. See FISHER, supra note 16, at 19.
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statute enacted pursuant to an explicit grant of congressional power (the power
to "make Rules concerning Captures on ... Water").6
Bas, Talbot, and Little, then, are only modest forays into the realm of foreign
relations, for they did not involve the Court in explicit interbranch disputes
concerning constitutional war powers. As Professor Yoo states,
Commentators have placed great store in these opinions, particularly
Little, as contemporaneous evidence showing that courts can exercise
jurisdiction over war power cases. However, none of these cases
called upon the Supreme Court to decide that the President was
waging war in violation of the Constitution, or that Congress had
failed to declare that a state of war existed, or that courts could step
in to adjudicate inter-branch disputes over war 2
Thus, the Court's involvement could be justified on three grounds: (1) that the
cases involved maritime and admiralty jurisdiction explicitly vested to federal
courts by Article HI;' (2) that deciding questions concerning liability for
damages resulting from alleged statutory violations is a common function of
courts and one in which the courts alone have expertise (and one not committed
to the other branches); and (3) as the Court has stated, that it need not avoid cases
that merely touch upon foreign affairs (as cases arising from admiralty and
maritime matters may often do) merely because the power to determine the course
of those affairs lies with the political branches." As Professor Yoo describes it,
the issues in the quasi-war cases "did not involve the power of going to war, but
rather the domestic and legal effects of war once it had begun." 5 Indeed, the
Court, the argument goes, merely decided upon the rights of individuals in private
lawsuits, consistent with the dictates of Marbury." Still, no matter how limited
the holdings were in these early cases, the Court's willingness to decide issues
such as when the conditions of war exist and whether military leaders may be
held liable for following presidential orders contrary to an act of Congress, raises
the question of how much further the Court will go to intervene in discretionary
foreign affairs decisions of political actors.
Importantly, other early opinions of the Marshall Court explicitly indicate the
prudence of a more limited role for the judiciary in questions involving foreign
affairs decision making. In United States v. The Schooner Peggy,67 the Court
refused to become involved in a case concerning the United States' alleged
violation of a treaty with France when it seized a ship near Haiti. The Chief
61. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
62. Yoo, supra note 32, at 293.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1.
64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (disavowing previous "sweeping statements to the
effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions").
65. Yoo, supra note 32, at 293.
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that the Court's province
is "solely to decide on the rights of individuals").
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
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Justice, no posterboy for judicial restraint during his tenure, explained that "if the
nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for
the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation.'""
Then came Marbury. Of course, Marbury enunciates that the Court possesses the
power of judicial review, the power to declare acts of Congress un-
constitutional."' But Chief Justice Marshall's Marbury opinion, sweeping though
it surely is, does not ignore the limited role of the courts in the constitutional
system and particularly in questions of foreign affairs. In an important statement,
Marshall explained,
The intimate political relation subsisting between the President of the
United States and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any
legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly
irksome, as well as delicate; and excites some hesitation with respect
to the propriety of entering into such investigation. Impressions are
often received without much reflection or examination, and it is not
wonderful that in such a case as this, the assertion, by an individual,
of his legal claims in a court of justice, to which claims it is the duty
of that court to attend, should at first view be considered by some, as
an attempt to intrude into the cabinet, and to intermeddle with the
prerogatives of the executive.
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to
such a jurisdiction. An extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could
not have been entertained for a moment. The province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the
executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made
in this court."
Marbury did not directly involve foreign affairs; however, Chief Justice
Marshall's explication of the political question doctrine, though not invoked in
Marbury, bears directly on courts' authority to intervene in military and
diplomatic disputes involving the President and Congress because the Constitution
vests foreign affairs discretion to those branches."' As Professor Rostow states,
68. id. at 110.
69. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
70. ld. at 169-70.
71. See Mikva, supra note 27, at 336 (stating that "[o]ver the years, the political question doctrine
has had particular resiliency in cases involving foreign policy" and that "the doctrine retains particular
force in the military context"). But see ELY, supra note 16, at 55 (remarking that it was the same John
Marshall of Marburys political question doctrine dicta that subsequently decided the issue in Little, and
questioning whether the doctrine still exists).
For another early case that implicated Marburys "political question" problem, see Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), which involved a plaintiff who sought damages for trespass of his home in
Rhode Island during the Dorr Rebellion of 1842. Defendants, who contended the plaintiff was a
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Marbury's description of the political question doctrine applies to various
decisions about foreign affairs: whether to act under a treaty; whether to aid an
ally that has been invaded or threatened; and whether a war has been "declared"
or whether it is merely imperfect.' These "all are matters peculiarly within the
discretion entrusted to the President, or to Congress, or to both, under our
constitutions and laws and, therefore, 'political' questions within the meaning of
Marbury v. Madison.""'
Chief Justice Marshall's admonition notwithstanding, The Prize Cases74 tested
the scope of judicial involvement in war powers disputes. These cases challenged
President Lincoln's blockade of southern ports before Congress had formally
declared war against the Confederate States of America.75 Ships taken as a result
of the blockade were claimed as prizes."6 The Court upheld the blockade."
Importantly, the Court did not determine whether a war existed, nor did it attempt
to define the boundaries of possible presidential or congressional action. Rather,
it deferred to President Lincoln's determination that the nation was at war and
recognized the President's authority to repel invasions even without prior congres-
sional authorization. " Most importantly, the Court refused to intervene in
determining what measures the President could take absent a formal declaration
of war.79 As the Court explained, the level of force necessary to repel an
invasion or meet a crisis is a determination only the President can make.' Thus,
The Prize Cases, like their early counterparts that decided predominantly narrow
questions of liability for private damages, demonstrated the Court's reluctance to
participant in the rebellion, claimed they acted on authority of the state government in entering the home.
Id. at 34-38. Plaintiff countered, however, that the government under which the authority was claimed
(Rhode Island's charter government) was not the lawful government of Rhode Island, and asked the court
to decide whether the rebellion was justified. Id. The Supreme Court refused to enter the dispute. The
Court stated that only Congress had authority to determine whether an established state government was
a "republican" government under the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 42; see also J. Peter Mulhem, In Defense
of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 104 (1988) (stating that "with the Luther
opinion, Chief Justice Marshall's Marbury dictum distinguishing political and legal questions became the
basis for an ill-defined exception to the scope of judicial authority Marbury claimed for the courts").
72. Rostow, supra note 15, at 894.
73. Id.
74. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
75. Id. at 640-43.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 671.
78. Id. at 670.
79. Id.
80. Id. Justice Grier explained,
Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties, as Commander in-chief, in suppressing
an insurrection has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such
alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents,
is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by the decisions and
acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted.
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offer sweeping judgments about the allocation of constitutional war power, even
though allocation issues were certainly the subtext of many of these early cases.
B. Early Modern Developments
From the quasi war with France to the Civil War, the post-Founding cases
demonstrate the Supreme Court's interest in resolving disputes involving liability
of government actors for private damages, but do not suggest the Court's
willingness to resolve broader questions concerning constitutional allocations of
power in military and diplomatic affairs. In the early 1900s, the Court
transformed this reluctance into an outright refusal to decide matters touching
national security when it declared, in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., "[W]hat may
be done in the exercise of this political power [foreign policy power] is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision."" The Court's absolutist pronouncement
was, as it should have been, short lived, for the Court's important opinion on the
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr expressly disavowed Oetjen's
language."2 Nonetheless, while the Court did, in the early modern era, as it did
in the formative years of the Republic, review and decide cases that touched the
powers of foreign policy, those cases (like their early counterparts) have not stood
to encourage greater intervention by the federal courts in modern constitutional
controversies over those powers. Rather, as demonstrated by the next subsection,
the courts often used the tools of justiciability to leave matters of war and peace
in the hands of political actors, particularly during and after the Vietnam War. 3
Two cases show important wrinkles in the fabric of this jurisprudence. First,
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.," the Court considered whether
Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the President when
it enacted a statute permitting the President to declare an arms embargo in South
America. Upholding the statute became the least important part of Justice
Sutherland's opinion for the Court. Rather, Justice Sutherland went beyond the
narrow delegation question at issue and rendered an explanation of expansive
presidential authority in foreign affairs."5 The President, the opinion concluded,
is the "sole organ" of foreign affairs. 6 Reminiscent of Hamilton's argument both
as Pacificus"7 and as Publius in The Federalist," Justice Sutherland wrote that
81. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
82. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962) (disavowing previous "sweeping statements to the effect
that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions").
83. See infra Part II.C, II.D and accompanying notes.
84. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
85. See id. at 319.
86. Id. (quoting 10 ANNALs OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall)).
87. See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 53-55.
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (urging
"[e]nergy in the executive" and stating that "[tihe ingredients which constitute energy in the executive
are unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and competent powers"); THE FEDERALIST No.
72, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that "[tlhe actual conduct of
foreign negotiations[,] ... the arrangement of the army and navy, [and] the direction of the operations
of war" are activities that fall within the administration of government, which is "the province of the
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the presidency was by nature the institution best suited for the management of the
"important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems" of foreign relations. 9
To meet the demands of the external realm, then, the President must be fortified
with authority to act in this realm even without the approval of the Congress.9
Although the opinion has received extensive criticism," it is often cited today
as authority for broad assertions of presidential power." Still, the Court's holding
was limited to the delegation question,9' Justice Sutherland's dictum concerning
presidential foreign relations power notwithstanding.
Second, the Court reviewed a case arising out of President Truman's decision
ordering the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation's steel mills during the
Korean War to ensure the production of weapons and war materials. 4 The Court
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, split six to three, rejected the
President's claims of inherent constitutional authority based on emergency
circumstances." The opinions of the plurality - Justices Frankfurter, Jackson,
Burton, and Clark - did not, however, insist upon specific constitutional or
statutory authority in responding to emergencies. 6 Justice Jackson's concurrence,
arguably the most famous opinion drawn from the case, identified three
circumstances of presidential action: (I) those taken pursuant to express or
implied congressional authorization (at which executive authority is at its height);
(2) those taken where Congress has specifically discouraged or prohibited the
action (at which executive power is at its lowest level); and (3) those actions
taken in the "zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress share
authority and in which Congress's own conduct may tend to invite - even
unwillingly - presidential action.97 "[O]nly Congress itself," Justice Jackson
executive department"). More specifically, Hamilton also argued that the President was best suited to
exercise powers of war:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction
of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the
executive authority.
THE FEDERAISr No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
89. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
90. Id. at 320.
91. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 16, at 57, 61 (describing Justice Sutherland's opinion as "badly
reasoned, badly grounded" and "filled with historical and conceptual inaccuracies").
92. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that, because the action at issue involved external
affairs, it was committed to the executive branch and thus the case posed a political question).
93. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322.
94. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (referred to as The Steel
Seizure Case).
95. Id. at 580-82.
96. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 657-58 (Burton,
J., concurring); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
[Vol. 54:685
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss4/2
WAR POWER: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
wrote, "can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.""5 As Louis Fisher
points out, Justice Jackson's concurrence offered a crucial caveat for Congress to
"invoke the institutional tools at its command rather than expect assistance from
the federal judiciary."" Thus, The Steel Seizure Case and Curtiss-Wright, like
the early cases, show judicial intervention in questions arising out of military and
diplomatic affairs (though Steel Seizure demonstrates a somewhat higher level of
judicial involvement while Curtiss-Wright proved more deferential). Neither,
however, attempted to precisely define the boundaries of congressional and
presidential foreign affairs powers, ostensibly leaving disputes over this particular
matter to the political branches.
C. The Vietnam War and the Rise of Judicial Deference
The Vietnam Era and its aftermath brought an unparalleled sequence of lawsuits
explicitly challenging presidential assertions of war power. These cases, if
pursued on the merits, would have forced the federal courts to expressly
determine issues concerning the precise allocation of constitutional war power,
issues that the federal judiciary had been able to avoid in past cases because the
cases did not sufficiently raise the question or were disposed of on other grounds.
In so doing, these cases would have challenged the limits of judicial review and
Article I authority, as well as the entire constitutional doctrine of the separation
of powers. In case after case, however, the federal courts used their own
institutional tools to place the matter back in the political branches and the
republican process.
The cases shifting decision-making power back to the political branch are
numerous, but a representative sampling adequately makes the point."m In
Orlando v. Laird,' Army servicemen ordered to Vietnam challenged the
executive branch's authority to engage in hostilities there and sought injunctive
relief prohibiting Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of the Army
Stanley R. Resor from enforcing the troop-deployment orders. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which in an earlier case involving one
of the same servicemen had held that the claim met general standards of
justiciability but had remanded for consideration under the political question
98. Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
99. FISHER, supra note 16, at 103.
100. For other cases from the era that involved military and/or foreign affairs, see Schlesinger v.
Reserists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge a congressman's membership in the Armed Forces Reserves as a violation of the Incom-
patibility Clause; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), recognizing the political nature of the question
involved, which challenged the Ohio Governor's use of the National Guard at Kent State University;
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), holding that a political question existed as to
the propriety of congressional methods for supporting military operations in Southeast Asia; Rusk v.
United States, 419 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1969), holding that draftees did not have standing to challenge the
legality of the war as a defense to charges of refusing to report for military duty; and Atlee v. Laird, 347
F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), recognizing that no standard existed for determining the existence of war
and for determining boundaries of presidential and congressional war power.
101. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
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doctrine," concluded that the political question doctrine did not foreclose the
question of whether Congress could participate mutually in a war.'"9 The
evidence clearly showed mutual participation." The political question doctrine
did, however, foreclose judicial consideration of the means by which Congress
participated."9 Such means are "outside the power and competency of the
judiciary, because there are no intelligible and objectively manageable standards
by which to judge such action.""
The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Massachusetts v. Laird,10
in which the plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the war in Vietnam was
unconstitutional and a prohibition on deploying Massachusetts residents to
Vietnam in the absence of a congressional declaration of war. The court found
that the judiciary "must have some license to construe the Constitutional
framework."'" It concluded, however, that, pursuant to Baker's textual-commit-
ment criterion, where a case involves
the power to conduct undeclared hostilities beyond emergency
defense, we are inclined to believe that the Constitution, in giving
some essential powers to Congress and others to the executive,
committed the matter to both branches, whose joint concord precludes
the judiciary from measuring a specific executive action against any
specific clause in isolation."
The court conceded that, in disposing of the case on textual-commitment grounds,
it had offered comments in dicta that analyzed the division of constitutional war
powers and implicitly addressed the issue concerning the allocation of those
powers." The panel ultimately concluded, though, that because the executive
and legislative branches did not oppose one another, it need not actually resolve
the allocation question."'
In DaCosta v. Laird,"2 the Second Circuit faced a different factual scenario
from the one presented in Orlando, but one that nevertheless challenged the
constitutionality of a presidential military order. DaCosta, an Army Specialist
stationed in Vietnam as a machine gunner, questioned whether the President could
order mining of the ports and harbors in North Vietnam."3 While the court
conceded that scholarly commentary regarding the political question doctrine was
102. See Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
103. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1043.
106. Id. at 1043-44.
107. 451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971).
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id.
111. Id. at34.
112. 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
113. ldU at 1147-48.
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divided,"" the court, bound by word from the Supreme Court, again found that
the case presented a nonjusticiable political question squarely within Baker's
meaning because the court could find no judicially discoverable or manageable
standards for resolving the issue."5
A still different issue faced the District of Columbia Circuit in Mitchell v.
Laird."6 There, unlike other prominent Vietnam-era cases in which the plaintiffs
were active or former members of the Armed Forces, thirteen members of the
House of Representatives, led by Rep. Parren Mitchell of Maryland, sought to
enjoin the President from further prosecuting the war in Vietnam and Laos." '7
The Congressmen claimed that the President's continued prosecution of the war
was unconstitutional and that, absent a congressional declaration, continued
prosecution of the hostilities impaired the members' rights to decide whether the
United States should engage in war."' Despite President Nixon's decision to
cease military hostilities in Vietnam and Laos, the court first rejected the
government's mootness argument because hostilities continued in Cambodia."9
The court also rejected the government's claim that the members lacked
standing."2 A judicial determination of whether the President's continued
military engagements in Cambodia violated the Constitution, the court concluded,
might bear directly upon the House's decision of whether to serve the President
with articles of impeachment.'
The Mitchell court ultimately dismissed the case, however, for two reasons: (1)
the government did not consent to the suit, and thus sovereign immunity
attached; " and (2) the case presented a political question." The panel con-
114. Id. at 1152-53.
115. Id. at 1155.
116. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir, 1973).
117. Id. at613.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 614. The doctrine of congressional standing, obviously important in the area of foreign
affairs, has had a bizarre and controversial history in the law of the District of Columbia Circuit,
Mitchell's holding notwithstanding. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge an executive order because the dispute
was susceptible to political resolution); see also Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946,
951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding standing based on the infringement of a legislators right to participate and
vote); id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that courts exist to decide upon individual rights, and
that legislators do not have private, cognizable interests in their public duties as lawmakers); VanderJagt
v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that congressmen had standing because they
could soundly assert that their votes had been diluted); id. at 1177 (Bork, J., concurring) (finding that
no legislative standing can exist without the nullification of a plaintiff-legislator's vote). For an analysis
of congressional standing jurisprudence, see Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing:
Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86
GEO. L.J. 351 (1997). See also Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 703 (1990) (criticizing congressional standing as an "invention" of the D.C. Circuit,
never intended by the Framers).
121. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614.
122. Id. at 613.
123. Id. at 616.
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ceded, contrary to an earlier holding on the question," that in some cases courts
may be competent to determine the allocation of constitutional war powers."
This, however, was not such a case because there was not sufficient evidence to
enable the court to determine whether President Nixon tried to cease all hostilities
when he took office." Even if the court had such evidence, moreover, it "would
not substitute its judgment for that of the President, who has an unusually wide
measure of discretion in this area, and who should not be judicially condemned
except in case of a clear abuse amounting to bad faith."'"
D. The Lessons of Vietnam
Although some courts deciding cases involving the Vietnam War were willing
to find an avenue for judicial resolution of war powers controversies, the courts
acted with caution and consistently determined that the plaintiffs in those lawsuits
could not obtain judicial relief. Most often, some doctrinal form of justiciability
prevented the success of such suits. This jurisprudential trend continued in the
post-Vietnam-era cases involving military and diplomatic issues.
Again, a few examples illustrate this point." In Goldwater v. Carter,' several
members of Congress, led by Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, challenged President
Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. President Carter
made this decision after his administration announced in 1978 that it would begin
recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole Chinese government. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and subsequently vacated and remanded the case
to the District of Columbia Circuit."w Four Justices, however, wrote separate
opinions discussing the various questions of justiciability that the case presented.
Justice Powell argued that the case was not ripe because Congress had not yet acted
to counter the President.3 1 Thus, no actual confrontation existed between the
executive and legislative branches. Justice Powell disagreed with Justice
Rehnquist, who argued that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.'33
In Justice Powell's view, the Constitution did not textually commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President, nor did courts lack judicially discoverable and
124. See Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
125. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614.
126. Id. at 616.
127. Id.
128. For other examples relevant to the subject matter here, see Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509,
511 (D.D.C. 1990), disposing, on political question grounds, of a challenge by a National Guard officer
who was ordered to the Persian Gulf and was claiming a violation of the Declare War Clause and the
War Powers Resolution; and Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987), rejecting a
challenge by 110 members of Congress to military operations in the Persian Gulf as a violation of the
War Powers Resolution.
129. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
130. Id at 996.
131. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. lad at 998 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in thejudgment). Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens. Id.
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manageable standards for resolving the question." Justice Rehnquist, however,
argued that the case was nonjusticiable "because it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the
Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President."'' 1 For
Justice Rehnquist, the fact that the case involved foreign relations compelled its
disposition on political question grounds, although he gave little explanation for that
conclusion short of a citation to Curtiss-Wright." In fact, in his dissent, Justice
Brennan took Justice Rehnquist to task, finding that Rehnquist had "misapprehended"
the political question doctrine by assuming that it raised an issue of political
discretion rather than constitutional law.'37 For Justice Brennan, the case was more
properly decided on textual-commitment grounds because the "Constitution commits
to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes.""'3 Thus, although Goldwater issued no majority opinion and no affir-
mative holding, the separate opinions provided an important glimpse into the minds
of the Justices concerning judicial review of certain questions of foreign relations.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Brennan
all argued for disposition of the case on nonjusticiability grounds under one doctrine
or another. Only Justices Blackmun and White would have set the case for argument
and considered the merits.
War powers, rather than treaty powers, were before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Crockett v. Reagan." There, twenty-nine
members of Congress sued President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, claiming that the executive
branch leaders violated the War Powers Clause, the War Powers Resolution, and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 when they supplied military equipment and aid to
134. Id. at 998-99 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist also argued that Steel
Seizure did not command a different conclusion here because that case involved the assertion of private
rights by a private plaintiff whereas the instant case involved public officials with political weapons at
their disposal, a fact that counseled strongly in favor of finding a political question to exist here but not
in Steel Seizure. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). As Professor Mulhem points
out, "[TJhis argument has strong roots in our constitutional tradition." Mulhern, supra note 71, at 167
n.263; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that it is the judiciary's
role to "solely, to decide on the rights of individuals"); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733
F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marbury's language and recognizing the
distinction between private plaintiffs and legislative plaintiffs); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 321-22 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that each branch has the "constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others"). But see Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz,
Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HoFMsTA L. REv. 215,248
n.138 (1985) (stating that the intended effect of Rehnquist's argument "might have been different....
These weapons remain intact no matter who the plaintiff is in a particular lawsuit.").
136. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
137. Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
140. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
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the government of El Salvador amidst that country's civil war.14 ' Judge Green
dismissed the case, holding that, the court's inability to conduct competent
factfinding, which would require inquiry into "sensitive military matters" for which
Congress possessed the better resources and expertise, precluded judicial review
under the political question doctrine.4 The District of Columbia Circuit agreed,
affirming the dismissal of the case on the same grounds.'43
Similarly, in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,'" the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed dismissal of a case in which various members of Congress, Nicaraguan
citizens, and Florida residents sued President Reagan and various executive officials
for giving support to the Nicaraguan Contras in violation of several statutes,
including the War Powers Resolution. Then-Judge Scalia, citing Crockett, concluded
that the political question doctrine required dismissal of the congressional plaintiffs'
war powers claim. As in Crockett and Mitchell, the members of Congress asserted
that they had been deprived of their right to participate in war-making decisions by
the executive branch's action.'
45
Finally, Dellums v. Bush'" presented the district court in the District of
Columbia with a challenge brought by fifty-four members of Congress, led by Rep.
Ronald Dellums of California. The congressmen, amidst the height of tensions in
the Persian Gulf after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, sought an injunction
preventing the first'President Bush from attacking Iraq without a congressional
declaration of war or other such authorization.'47 Judge Greene offered a substan-
tial analysis of the President's political question argument, but rejected it, asserting
that courts "do not lack the power and ability to make the factual and legal
determination of whether the nation's military actions constitute war for purposes
of the constitutional War Powers Clause."'" Having held that a court could
conclude that a "war" in the constitutional sense existed,4 ' Judge Greene next
considered whether the doctrine of standing prevented the suit. Again, he rejected
the arguments of the President's lawyers, concluding that the injury was more than
speculative because there existed a very real possibility that the President would go
to war in Iraq without first seeking congressional approval.'" Finally, however,
Judge Greene determined that the ripeness doctrine precluded a decision on the
merits.' He wrote:
141. Id. at 895.
142. Id. at 898-99.
143. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
144. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
145. Id. at 210.
146. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
147. Id. at 1144.
148. Id. at 1146 (citing Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
149. Id. at 1145.
150. Id. at 1147-48.
151. Id. at 1152, see also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D.D.C. 1990) (concluding that the
lawsuit filed by a National Guard sergeant against President Bush was not ripe because it called for
speculation as to whether the President would send troops to war in the Persian Gulf). Judge Lamberth
in Ange, however, more forcefully employed the political question doctrine in rejecting the suit at issue
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The principle that courts shall be prudent in the exercise of their
authority is never more compelling than when they are called upon to
adjudicate on such sensitive issues as those trenching upon military and
foreign affairs. Judicial restraint must, of course, be even further
enhanced when the issue is one - as here - on which the other two
branches may be deeply divided."s
Citing Justice Powell's Goldwater concurrence, Judge Greene concluded that the
case was not ripe because (1) a majority of Congress was not party to the suit, and
only a majority of Congress can declare war;'53 and (2) the executive branch "has
not shown a commitment to a definitive course of action sufficient to support
ripeness.""
E. Campbell v. Clinton: A Contemporary Version of an Old Favorite
Since 1998, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member countries have been engaged in a diplomatic enterprise in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to resolve an ongoing conflict between ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo, a region of Serbia, and ethnic Serbs led by Slobodan
Milosevic. 55 By March 1999, however, negotiations - enhanced earlier by an
interim peace agreement proposed in Rambouillet, France - stalled." Milosevic
subsequently intensified Serb aggression, driving thousands of ethnic Albanians
from their homes, executing them, and destroying their villages."5 After another
diplomatic effort failed, the United States Senate authorized a concurrent resolution
permitting President Clinton to conduct airstrikes against Serbia and Montenegro in
Yugoslavia.'
On March 24, 1999, the day the Senate Resolution passed, President Clinton
commenced the airstrikes, using both American and NATO forces.'59 Two days
there than did Judge Greene in Dellums. See id. at 512.
152. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149.
153. Id. at 1150-51; see also ELY, supra note 16, at 58 (questioning Judge Greene's conclusion on
this count and stating, "[M]aybe Greene just worded it the wrong way around. If it takes a majority of
Congress to declare war, it also takes a majority to block one."). Dean Ely further stated, "[T]he fact that
a majority can block a war by refusing to vote yes still should not imply a power on the part of the
president to go forward unless a majority can organize itself to vote (or sue) no." Id. at 59.
154. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1152.
155. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
For a discussion of the constitutional and political implications of the Kosovo matter, see John C. Yoo,
Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673 (2000). See also Louis
Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (2000) (critiquing Yoo's work and
providing an analysis of President Clinton's military actions); C. Boyden Gray, The War in Kosovo:
Failed Lessons of Incrementalism, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 5 (2000) (discussing Kosovo and the lessons
of Vietnam); Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millenium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11 (2000) (using the
Kosovo operations as an example of congressional acquiescence in presidential war making).
156. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
157. Id.
158. See S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
159. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
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later he detailed the operation in a letter to Rep. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, the
Speaker of the House, and Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the President
pro tempore. The letter stated that the President had taken the military action
"pursuant to [his] authority . . . as Commander in Chief."'" The President sent
another letter to Speaker Hastert and Senator Thurmond on April 7, in an effort to
keep the Congress apprised of the operation.' On April 28, the House refused to
declare war with Yugoslavia and rejected the concurrent resolution that the Senate
had passed in March.'62 The House also defeated a measure that would have
directed the President to withdraw troops from the region,'63 and passed a bill that
prohibited Department of Defense funds for the use of American ground forces in
Yugoslavia without congressional authorization.'" On May 20, however, Congress
approved an appropriations bill to support the operation, but it did not state in the
legislation that it authorized the operation within the meaning of the War Powers
Resolution.65 The conflict between NATO forces and Yugoslavia ended on June
10, when Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw forces from Kosovo and permit a NATO-
led peacekeeping mission.
Prior to termination of the conflict, however, thirty-one members of Congress, led
by Rep. Tom Campbell of California, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that President Clinton's
commencement and continuation of the airstrikes violated the War Powers Clause
and the War Powers Resolution." The plaintiffs claimed that their votes against
authorizing the operation were effectively nullified by the President's actions.67
Judge Friedman, however, ordered the case dismissed for lack of standing. The
opinion cited Raines v. Byrd,' which held that members of Congress lacked
standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, and Coleman v. Miller,"A which
found that twenty members of the Kansas Senate had standing to challenge the
Kansas Lieutenant Governor's deciding vote on a federal constitutional amendment,
which the Senators had voted against. Judge Friedman found that, although Raines
160. Id at 37-38.
161. Id. at 38.
162. See H.R. J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999); S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
163. See H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong (1999).
164. See H.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999).
165. See 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57.
166. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
167. See id.
168. 521 U.S. 811, 818-30 (1997). The Raines Court stated that the legislators' claims did not
involve injury to themselves as individuals, but rather institutional injury that was "wholly abstract and
widely dispersed." Id. at 829. Thus, without showing that their votes had been nullified, they lacked a
sufficient "personal stake" in the outcome. Id at 830. Interestingly, Justice Souter's concurrence
examined a problem that the majority opinion raised and that was evident from Justice Rehnquist's
separate opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 n.l (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring),
concerning the distinction between personal and official injury. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830-31 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment). "[lit is at least arguable," Justice Souter stated, "that the official nature of
the harm here does not preclude standing." Id. at 831 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For an
analysis of Raines' application to war powers disputes, see Entin, supra note 33, at 1308-10.
169. 307 U.S. 433, 437-46 (1939).
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created a "Coleman exception,"'' 0 which grants standing to legislators where "their
votes have been 'completely nullified".. or "virtually held for naught,"'" the
plaintiffs in this case could not sufficiently establish such an injury in the absence
of "a true 'constitutional impasse' or 'actual confrontation' between the legislative
and executive branches.""' Congress did not issue a directive to withdraw troops
that the President ignored, nor did the President spend funds that the Congress
refused to appropriate.' 7' Indeed, as the court described, none of the votes on
which the members of Congress based their claim "required the President to do
anything or prohibited him from doing anything.""' Thus, the court held, "resort
to the [judiciary was] inappropriate."'7
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
on the same grounds." As to the War Powers Resolution claim, Judge Silber-
man's opinion for the court conceded that Coleman's use of the word "nullified" was
ambiguous, but concluded, after examining Raines, that Coleman nullification
hinged on the irreversibility of the constitutional amendment at issue in that
case."' The Kansas legislators did not possess the political remedy that the Raines
plaintiffs did - the legislators could simply have repealed the statute that they were
challenging, a much easier task than changing a constitutional provision."' Thus,
the Campbell plaintiffs "fail[ed] because they continued, after the votes, to enjoy
ample legislative power to have stopped prosecution of [that] 'war." '' ' As to the
War Powers Clause claim, the congressmen fared no better. Again, the court
explained, Raines recognized that the availability of "political self-help" undermines
170. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
171. Id. at 43 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823).
172. ld. (quoting Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438).
173. Id. Judge Friedman noted that the "mere availability of a legislative alternative is not sufficient
to defeat standing; if it were, a legislator would never have standing since Congress always has the
option of impeaching and removing the President." Id. at 45 n.11. One response to this is: exactly. See
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring).
But another response is that, even if we accept the constitutional legitimacy of legislative standing (as
we must after Raines) where there has been nullification, Congress may only impeach for treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Thus, if Congress, as the sole expositor of the
Impeachment Clause, determined that a particular presidential action did not fall into a category of
impeachable offenses, then impeachment is not an option and standing could not be defeated on that
ground alone. Judge Friedman, though, accounts for this when he discusses actions that Congress
"actually took." Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 45 n.1 1.
174. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 44-45.
175. Id. at 43.
176. Id. at 45; see also Major Geoffrey Coin, Campbell v. Clinton: The "Implied Consent" Theory
of Presidential War Power Is Again Validated, 161 MIL. L. REv. 202, 214 (1999) (arguing that the "case
confirms a consistent course followed by the judiciary when asked to adjudicate the legality of
presidential decisions to engage the United States Armed Forces in hostilities: focus on whether such a
challenge presents a truly ripe issue"). Major Corn's piece was published prior to the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision on appeal.
177. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
178. Id. at 22-23.
179. Id. at 23.
180. Id.
2001]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the claim to congressional standing.' These members of Congress thus could not
challenge the presidential action "because they may 'fight again tomorrow.""' The
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari in the case, without additional
comment, during the 2000-2001 Term."'
Perhaps the most interesting portion of Campbell in the circuit court, however,
is not found in the majority opinion at all, though the holding certainly represents
a crucial element of Campbell's long-term importance. All three panel judges
offered separate concurring opinions, which the judges used to debate various
justiciability issues related to war powers lawsuits. Judges Silberman and Tatel,
agreeing that Raines deprived the congressmen of standing, nevertheless engaged
in an illuminating discussion of the political question doctrine. Judge Randolph took
the opportunity to reexamine the majority's use of the standing doctrine and to
implicate the mootness doctrine as an alternative ground for disposing of the
case.1"
Judge Silberman began his concurrence with the observation that "no one is able
to bring this challenge because the two claims are not justiciable. We lack
judicially discoverable and manageable standards' for addressing them, and the War
Powers Clause claim implicates the political question doctrine.""'  First, Judge
Silberman argued, the War Powers Resolution claim was unsuited for judicial
resolution because the statute's triggering mechanism is too imprecise and calls for
the exercise of political, not judicial, judgment." Thus the plaintiffs' argument -
181. ld. at 24. But see Recent Cases, D.C. Circuit Holds That Members of Congress May Not
Challenge the President's Use of Troops in Kosovo, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2134,2136 n.26 (2000) (arguing
that the Campbell majority's "general reading of Raines is strained").
182. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24 (quoting Judge Randolph's opinion concurring in the judgment).
183. Campbell v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
184. Judge Randolph avoided the debate concerning application of the political question doctrine.
Instead, he claimed that the majority had offered the wrong analysis of Raines and the standing issue.
Campbell, 203 F.3d at 28 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment). As for the constitutional claim,
Judge Randolph explained, much as did Judge Friedman in the District Court, that "plaintiffs' votes...
were not for naught" because the President did not take an action, despite the House vote, that would
have been authorized only in the midst of a declared war. Id. at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring in the
judgment). As for the War Powers Resolution claim, the plaintiffs were essentially arguing that the
President ignored not their votes, but those of the Congress that approved the War Powers Resolution,
an insufficient basis for permitting litigation by members of Congress. Id. In addition, Judge Randolph
argued that the majority misstated Raines by illogically concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they could "fight again tomorrow." ld. at 32 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment). He
argued that the majority opinion essentially eviscerated legislative standing in the course of misreading
both the Supreme Court's and the D.C. Circuit's precedents. Id. Finally, Judge Randolph concluded that
the court could dispose of the case on mootness grounds. Id. at 28 (Randolph, J., concurring in the
judgment). Although the plaintiffs claimed the case was one "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
Judge Randolph noted that "offensive wars initiated without congressional approval" do not present cases
that evade review. Id. at 33 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment). Nor was the case "capable of
repetition," as it was unlikely that President Clinton would engage in the same action during the same
plaintiffs period in office. Id. at 34 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring).
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that a "war" indisputably existed here - was inapposite.' Second, no principled
judicial standard exists for defining a "war" for purposes of constitutional
interpretation.' Although Judge Tatel agreed with the plaintiffs that the United
States was obviously engaging in acts of war,'" Judge Silberman replied, "Even
if this court knows all there is to know about the Kosovo conflict, we still do not
know what standards to apply to those facts."'"
Judge Tatel responded by citing the early and modern foreign affairs cases, in
which the Supreme Court and various lower federal courts willingly exercised the
judicial power vested in them by Article H.' 9' From Bas, Talbot, and The Prize
Cases through the Vietnam-era decisions, "standards for answering these questions
[which involve constitutional terms that are not self-defining] have evolved, as legal
standards always do, through years of judicial decisionmaking. Courts have proven
no less capable of developing standards to resolve war powers challenges," Judge
Tatel wrote." Judge Tatel noted that, throughout the case law, courts had
routinely determined and defined the conditions of war when examining the
Constitution, statutes, and even insurance policies and other contracts that implicate
"war."093 In addition, Judge Tatel explained, judicial resolution of the constitutional
question would not, as the President and Judge Silberman would have it, involve the
court in political decision making." Rather, the questiohs presented on the merits,
though their answers surely would have political effects, would be "purely legal"
ones.' 5 Thus, in an appropriate case where other questions of justiciability
(standing, ripeness, and mootness) were met, the court would have a duty to
determine whether the President had exceeded the bounds of the Constitution by
conducting such a military operation, even if such a determination produced "short-
term confusion.""'
In his own reply, Judge Silberman explained that the cases upon which Judge
Tatel relied either (1) did not attempt to define "war" in the constitutional sense
(such as Bas), (2) did not question the level of force that the President could use in
commencing a military action (such as The Prize Cases), or (3) ultimately found a
political question to exist (such as Massachusetts v. Laird). Finally, Judge
Silberman expressed the pragmatic concern that a judicial decision invalidating a
presidential decision to commit troops - a decision made on national television and
in concert with leaders from other nations - may have the undesirable political
187. Id.
188. Id. at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 40 (Tatel, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 26 (Silberman, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 37-39 (Tatel, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 37 (Tate], J., concurring).
193. id. at 39 (Tatel, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 40 (Tatel, J., concurring).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 41 (Tatel, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 25 n.1, 26-27 (Silberman, J., concurring).
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effect of straining America's relations with its allies.'98 Precedent and prudence,
Judge Silberman seemed to suggest, dictated the conclusion that "whether the
President has intruded on the war-declaring authority of Congress fits squarely
within the political question doctrine."'"
Campbell represents an important strand in the long line of war powers cases. It
provides an original, post-Raines perspective on the ways in which the doctrine of
standing serves to further restrict the judiciary's role when called upon to referee
interbranch disputes concerning the allocation of war powers. The holding and the
intersection of standing with the separation of powers, however, is only a small
piece of Campbell's artifice. Most importantly, the separate opinions provide useful
insight into the varying theories of judicial competence and responsibility in this
area, theories that have evolved from the post-Revolution cases through the Vietnam
and contemporary eras. Although incomplete, as none of the opinions dealt
comprehensively with the textual commitment of the issue to the political branches
or with questions about the nature and desirability of political branch constitutional
deliberation, each opinion provided a rationale for disposing of the case that avoided
judicial resolution of the war powers question and worked to preserve the separation
of powers. Thus, whether we accept Judge Silberman's political question doctrine
argument (a doctrine developed to preserve the separation of powers),a ° Judge
Randolph's mootness argument (another doctrine that serves the separation of
powers by limiting the judiciary to resolution of cases where an actual remedy is
available, thus avoiding a mere advisory decision),8" or the standing arguments of
all three (standing being "founded in concern about the proper - and . . .
limited - role of the courts in a democratic society"),' we see that Campbell
stands firm with a long line of modern cases. Those cases, borne of concerns that
arose during the Washington administration, use the various constitutional doctrines
of justiciability that operate to preclude judicial review of questions implicating the
allocation of constitutional war powers.'
198. lId at 27-28 (Silberman, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 28 (Silberman, J., concurring).
200. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 252 (1992) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)) (stating that "[t]he political question doctrine is
'essentially a function of the separation of powers'"); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394
(1990) (stating that the political question doctrine constrains the judiciary "from inappropriate interference
in the business of.. . other branches of Government").
201. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998) ("[M]ootness... deprives us of our power to
act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.").
202. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982) (explaining that standing
is a "precondition" to "[t]he exercise of judicial power [that] affects relationships between the coequal
arms of the National Government").
203. But see Recent Cases, supra note 181, at 2139 (criticizing Campbell and stating that "[a]fter
Campbell, future legislatures and executives face multiple levels of uncertainty about war powers
questions"). Perhaps, though, this uncertainty will encourage more thoughtful deliberation and more
careful political consideration of the alternatives available in the constitutional system.
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The sampling of cases analyzed in this section sufficiently demonstrate the
prevailing trend in the federal courts to use the doctrinal tools of justiciability -
ripeness, mootness, standing, and the political question doctrine - to ensure that
only members of the political branches guide American foreign relations, given the
expertise, resources, and alternatives available to legislators and executive branch
officials. Of course, courts have, from the earliest days of the federal judiciary,
decided cases that touched upon foreign relations and that involved usurpation of
one of the political branches by the other. The judiciary, however, has largely
(though perhaps not exclusively) stopped short of officiating disputes between the
political branches regarding the proper allocation of war and diplomatic powers,
thanks, in significant measure, to the justiciability doctrines borne of the separation
of powers. In this sense, the judiciary has helped to maintain a prudent separation
of powers by limiting the judge's role and by encouraging political branch resolution
of complex issues of war and foreign policy.
IlL Constitutional Deliberation in the Political Branches: Back Where the War
Powers Belong
Despite the judiciary's occasional foray into the arena of war and peace, the
separation of powers counsels that disputes specifically concerning the allocation of
constitutional authority under the War Powers Clause and the War Powers
Resolution are best left for disposition in the political branches. As this section
explains, there are two primary reasons for this, each of which is consonant with
our constitutional text and traditions. First, the various doctrines of justiciability,
which are necessary for, and a prudent means of, effectuating a meaningful
constitutional separation of powers, preclude judicial intervention in war powers
disputes. And second, judicial abstention in such disputes encourages constitutional
deliberation among the political branches, which have an independent and equally
important duty to consider the Constitution's meaning.
A. War Powers Controversies and Justiciability
Interbranch disputes concerning the allocation of war powers implicate the
political question doctrine because the resolution of such disputes is textually
committed to the political branches.' A few of the cases have mentioned this
concept but, unfortunately, have barely discussed it.' Instead, the cases have
focused upon the lack of standards for judicial resolution or upon the possibility that
a judicial decision will interfere unduly with the conduct of foreign relations,"
204. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); cf. Robert . Pushaw, Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 393, 451 (1993) (arguing that
constitutional history demonstrates that "the presumption favoring judicial review could be rebutted only
by a showing that the Constitution committed a question entirely to the political branches - for example,
the President's decisions about ... foreign affairs... and Congress's power to declare war").
205. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1973).
206. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring);
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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both of which also provide compelling justifications for invoking the doctrine. But
those arguments, both within the scope of Bakers political question definitional
analysis, have their roots in the Constitution's textual commitment of the issue to
the Congress and the President. Courts often lack 'judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" because the Constitution recognizes that the expertise and
resources for managing military and diplomatic affairs rest with the political
branches. And undue judicial interference in foreign policy matters is a concern
precisely because the Constitution does not vest courts with any power to determine
foreign policy; intrusion would thus negatively affect the practical governance of the
nation in this area.' Therefore, Baker's "textually demonstrable commitment"
element of the political question doctrine must ultimately lie at the heart of judicial
abstention in war powers controversies. This conclusion is consistent both with
Marbury's statements of the role of the courts (echoed in Marshall's comments
concerning the limits of judicial power),' which expressly denounce judicial
involvement in "political questions,"' and with Madison's statement that the
courts were to have jurisdiction only in cases "of a Judiciary Nature,""21 which
clearly recognizes that some suits are ill suited for resolution in the federal courts.
Article I, recall, vests in Congress (and only in Congress, as the Court recognized
as early as Talbot)... the power to "declare" war. By authorizing Congress to
"declare" war, the Constitution recognizes that Congress alone must determine when
the conditions of war exist. On this matter, Professor Yoo provides excellent
insight. As he has persuasively explained, this power is essentially an adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial power,"' for in making such judgments about the "current status
of relations," Congress performs a function "which involves a capacity for judgment
in the manner of a court, rather than the enactment of positive law in the style of
a legislature.""2 ' This is no linguistic accident; the Constitution vests judicial-type
powers to the political branches in other places, too, where the Framers believed the
political nature of the matters at issue was best suited to the judgment of politically
accountable actors, The House's power to impeach"" and the Senate's power to try
207. See David E. Marion, The State of the Canon in Constitutional Law: Lessons from the
Jurisprudence of John Marshall, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 385,416 (2001). Professor Marion argues
that Madison and Marshall were statesmen who recognized the importance of practical governance,
eschewing utopian models of political life. In particular, he notes Madison's belief that "we should not
overlook the practical demands of effective governance, among which is the need to allow the political
departments to do their work free of excessive judicial intrusion." Id.
208. See Marshall, supra note 10, at 95.
209. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
210. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 8, at 430.
211. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
212. Although Professor Yoo describes this as a "judicial" function, this article uses the phrase
"adjudicatory or quasi-judicial" to emphasize that the act is not a judicial act in the "case or controversy"
sense (which Madison seems to give it in Federalist No. 47). but rather it is simply akin to the kind of
act that a judge would perform, See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (explaining that "[tlhe entire legislature can perform no judiciary act" except the removal of
judges and the trial of impeachments in the Senate).
213. Yoo, supra note 32, at 248-49.
214. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 15 ("The House of Representatives... shall have the sole
[Vol. 54:685
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss4/2
WAR POWER: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
impeachments are suitable examples."' The Framers, moreover, invested the
President with some powers that appear, by their nature, legislative: the President
can veto legislation, make treaties with Senate advice and consent, and recommend
legislation to Congress.2 6 True, the Constitution generally recognizes separate and
distinct powers in the three branches," 7 and, generally, one branch may not
exercise a category of power reserved to another branch, except where the
Constitution by its own terms mixes those powers in a few specific and enumerated
areas."' "Ambition," we see, was "made to counteract ambition,""2 9 even if this
included vesting one category of power (e.g., judicial power) in a branch that
otherwise would hold a different category of power (e.g., legislative power). Thus,
"[b]ecause the Constitution has vested Congress with the entire judicial power to
decide whether the United States is in a state of war, no role for the courts is war-
ranted."'
Compare Congress's declaratory war powers (as well as its related enumerated
powers such as raising and supporting the armed forces and granting letters of
marque and reprisal) with the President's power as commander in chief. As such,
the President alone must make determinations about how to conduct military
operations. This, too, is a decisional function committed only to the executive
branch. Courts have conceded that they may not determine the level of force the
President may use, nor may they attempt to define the scope of military mis-
sions.' But any attempt to define the boundaries of commander in chief power
in the context of a civil lawsuit would pose the risk of doing just that, of limiting
the President's ability to determine the course of military operations during war or
warlike conditions.' Of course, the Constitution does not permit the President to
exceed his boundaries, but for courts to use this as a reason for judicial intervention
begs the question. For it is not the judiciary that enforces the limits of presidential
Power of Impeachment.").
215. See id. art I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.").
216. See id. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, §§ 2, 3; see also Yoo, supra note 32, at 249 (discussing the
"legislative" powers vested in the President).
217. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
218. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining the view, derived from Montesquieu, that "where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted"); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Ulnless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give...
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as
essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.").
219. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
220. Yoo, supra note 32, at 249.
221. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
222. See Marshall, supra note 10, at 95 ("[I]f [the judicial power extended] to every question under
the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every subject on which the executive
could act.... mhe department[] would be swallowed up by the judiciary."); see also id. at 103 (stating
that legal questions about vessels captured off the coast of the United States "were questions of political
law, proper to be decided and they were decided by the executive and not the courts").
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war power, but the Congress, through its declaratory powers, its related foreign
affairs functions, and its power to define "high crimes and misdemeanors," which
could conceivably include conducting military operations without congressional
approval.' In turn, the President can lodge a legally cognizable constitutional
objection to congressional action by exercising his veto power. Indeed, President
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution precisely because, by his interpretation
of the Constitution, the resolution interfered with his exclusive power to act as
commander in chief"' Thus, once we consider congressional and executive
powers-in the military and foreign relations context, we see that no room remains
for judicial involvement. Any dispute over boundaries can be resolved by a political
branch determination. Madison's statement about the powers of the political
branches to determine constitutional boundaries lends even greater credibility to this
conclusion," as does his argument, followed by Marshall, that the courts were to
have authority only in cases "of a judiciary nature."'t
This conclusion also serves to discountenance Justice Brennan's statement in
Goldwater that "[t]he issue of decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a
matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the
competence of the courts." 7 Justice Brennan's logic implies first, that all
questions of constitutional law are properly the subject of judicial review, and
second, that questions of constitutional law cannot also be matters of political
discretion. But this, as we have seen in examining the constitutional text, is not so.
Questions concerning the constitutional meaning of "high crimes and mis-
demeanors," for example, are clearly matters of constitutional law committed also
to political discretion (and hence are left to the House and not the courts).m
Similarly, the question of whether America is at war in the constitutional sense of
the term is a question of both constitutional interpretation and political judgment
(particularly if we follow Clausewitz's maxim that war is "politics by other means").
Yet that question is committed solely to the Congress and thus is not within the
223. For an excellent inquiry into impeachment generally and a discussion of the standards that
might be used to determine whether such an act would be impeachable, see CHARLES L. BLACK JR.,
IMPEACHMENT (1974). Although Congress should not use impeachment merely for political reasons, it
may use impeachment as a political weapon where an executive political act has amounted to an abuse
of power, has undermined the functioning of a coordinate branch, or is a serious violation of the public
trust that undermines confidence in the President's ability to do his job. Cf. J. Richard Broughton, Paying
Ambition's Debt: Can the Separation of Powers Tame the Impetuous Vortex of Congressional
Investigations?, 21 WHrTrER L. REv. 797, 833-35 (2000) (arguing that Congress could impeach the
President for refusing to comply with a congressional investigation if such refusal falls into one of the
above categories and is used merely as a political weapon, divorced from any serious constitutional
harm).
224. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 PuB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973) (co-
mmunicating to Congress the veto of the War Powers Resolution and arguing that the "only way the
constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution
and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force").
225. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
226. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 8, at 430.
227. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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competence of the courts. Justice Brennan's attempt to distinguish constitutional law
proper from politics, while perhaps appropriate in some areas of constitutional
adjudication, is therefore inappropriate in the context of constitutional war powers,
which the Framers deliberately placed in the political arena.'
Another compelling element of the Constitution's textual commitment of war
powers disputes to the political branches is the availability of remedies in the form
of political self-help. As noted above, the President can veto legislation that he
believes intrudes upon his war powers.' Even more powerful, Congress has the
power to withdraw funding for military operations, and it can impeach and remove
the President if it believes he has committed a "high crime or misdemeanor" within
the meaning of the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist recognized this in his Goldwater
concurrence when he noted the difference between private plaintiffs and legislative
plaintiffs,"' and Judge Silberman reiterated it in his Campbell opinion concerning
legislative standingY2 Having such alternatives helps to provide a remedy to
potential litigants that is not normally available in constitutional litigation.
Arguments from the Founding, bolstered by the constitutional text, lend support
to this position in the area of the appropriations power. 3 The Constitution
separates the powers of the sword and of the purse, leaving the latter exclusively
to Congress, notably, in the area of military appropriations.' This enables
Congress to check presidential war power with its powers of the purse. To the
Framers, this arrangement, which allows no judicial role, promoted safe government.
In Professor Yoo's words, "[T]he Framers seem to have expected the branches to
pursue their war goals by relying on their own constitutional powers to check each
other. Congress would control the executive initiative in war with its power over
funding, just as Parliament and the colonial and state legislatures had done.""
Similarly, impeachment is an important factor that, for example, Judge
Wyzanski's opinion overlooked in Mitchell, even though it ultimately found a
political question to exist. The opinion stated, "[A] court would not substitute its
judgment for that of the president, who has an unusually wide measure of discretion
in this area, and who should not be judicially condemned except in a case of clear
229. See Yoo, supra note 32, at 288 ("Having placed war powers in the arena of politics, the
Framers would have viewed inter-branch disputes in the area as unsuitable for judicial resolution. Such
disputes would not constitute an Article III 'Case,' because no party could make a claim of right
enforceable in court.").
230. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 224, at 893 (vetoing the War Powers
Resolution as a violation of the Commander in Chief Clause).
231. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
232. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
233. See John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1169, 1206-07 (1999). Professor Yoo invokes Madison's and other Federalists' statements at the
time of the Founding to indicate that "the Constitution vested the purse and the sword in the national
government, but that did not place them in the same hands .... Federalists understood Congress's power
of the purse as the primary check on presidential use of the military." Id.
234. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . To raise and support
Armies... To provide and maintain a Navy.").
235. Yon, supra note 233, at 1207.
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abuse amounting to bad faith."' If, however, the President did clearly abuse his
power in bad faith, this would be an appropriate situation for the House to consider
impeachment. Thus, judicial resolution would be precluded in any event because the
Constitution provides that only the House and Senate have a role in the impeach-
ment process. Indeed, to borrow from Burke, impeachment is the preferred remedy
where the legislature believes that the executive has abused his authority. 7 For,
as Professor Amar has explained, impeachment (as opposed to a civil lawsuit) is
national, it is public, it is political and thus connected to the citizenry, and it is final,
with no possibility of judicial review.' As an aside, though, Congress should be
careful in these situations not to use the impeachment power merely for political
reasons, such as its disapproval of presidential policy preferences. Instead, the
impeachment decision must be anchored by some serious, identifiable harm that a
presidential act of war has caused to the state and the institutions of government."
The possibility of resorting to self-help, then, be it presidential veto, commander in
chief power, or congressional appropriations or impeachment power, counsels
against judicial involvement in war powers disputes and in favor of leaving the
political branches to their own substantial devices.
Finally, aside from the political question doctrine's existence as a safeguard of the
separation of powers, we know that courts still would be unlikely to referee
interbranch war powers controversies because of the existence of other doctrines of
justiciability that also preserve the separation of powers.' As the law of jus-
ticiability evolved in the latter part of the twentieth century - an evolution that has
operated appropriately to limit the role of the judicial branch under Article fI"
236. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
237. See Edmund Burke, Speeches in the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, Esquire, Late Governor
of Bengal, in EDMUND BURKE, SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHEs 399 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., Gateway
Editions 1963) (stating that "no man... has a right to arbitrary power").
238. See Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Impeachment, 20 AM. LAw. 92, 94 (1998).
239. See Broughton, supra note 223, at 835 (advising Congress to avoid impeachment merely
because it disagrees with the President, lest the impeachment power become one akin to the
parliamentary system); see also BLACK, supra note 223, at 27-28 (highlighting the debate over
impeachment in the Constitutional Convention). Professor Black points to a moment during the
Constitutional Convention when George Mason offered to include the phrase "maladministration" in the
Impeachment Clause. Id. Madison objected, saying that the term would "be equivalent to a tenure during
the pleasure of the Senate." Id. at 28. Mason subsequently offered the phrase "other high crimes and
misdemeanors," which the Convention adopted. Id.
240. See Entin, supra note 33, at 1307 (stating that cases deciding war powers questions are unusual
because "there are various procedural and jurisdictional obstacles to litigating over war powers and
foreign affairs"); Louis Henkin, Preface, The Constitution for Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 713, 714 (1989) (stating that "courts have not contributed to the law of foreign affairs as they
have to constitutional jurisprudence generally, if only because few issues can overcome the hurdles to
adjudication set up by requirements of case or controversy, standing to sue, (and] justiciability"); Mikva,
supra note 27, at 339 ("Clearly if a court wishes to avoid deciding a war powers question, it has the
doctrinal tools to do so.").
241. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998) (stating that "mootness ... deprives us of our
power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so"); Suitum v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733 n.7 (1997) (holding that the "'ripeness doctrine is drawn both
from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise
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so too did its application in foreign affairs cases.Z The Vietnam and post-
Vietnam-era cases, most recently Campbell, indicate that judges have numerous
tools to use in leaving war powers allocation disputes to the political branches, from
the law of standing to the timing doctrines of ripeness and mootness. 3 Indeed,
the cases indicate that these doctrines have served as the judiciary's first line of
defense, so to speak, with the political question doctrine usually operating only as
a last resort. Thus, once we combine the major doctrines of justiciability -
standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine - with an analysis
of the constitutional text, structure, and tradition that those doctrines help to
reinforce, we see that the resolution of war powers disputes belongs to the political
branches, not the judiciary. If left there, we inch closer to effectuating Madison's
belief, as Professor Marion describes it, "that we should not overlook the practical
demands of effective departments, among which is the need to allow the political
branches to do their work free of excessive judicial intrusion."'
B. The Political Branches and Constitutional Deliberation
Judicial abstention from war powers disputes between the Congress and the
President does more than preserve the separation of powers, although that is its
primary virtue. 5 It also promotes constitutional deliberation in the political
jurisdiction'") (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Seres. Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring plaintiffs to allege a personal injury that
is particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable, and holding that "the core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III"); Burke
v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) ("Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case
or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case, it is not enough that there may have been
a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing.")
(emphasis added); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that Article III courts lack
jurisdiction over a suit unless the plaintiff has suffered "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief" and that "the law of Article
III standing is built on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers"); cf. Pushaw, supra note
204, at 436-51 (describing the early Supreme Courts approach to justiciability and its relationship to the
separation of powers).
242. See supra Part II. C, D, & E; see also Henkin, supra note 240, at 714 (noting that justiciability
requirements have led the Supreme Court to contribute less to foreign affairs than other areas of
constitutional law).
243. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F,3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (disposing of a case on
standing grounds); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990) (disposing of a case on
ripeness grounds); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1973) (disposing ofa case on political
question grounds).
244. Marion, supra note 207, at 416; cf. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (arguing that courts should not intrude in questions of constitutional structure
except where necessary to protect individual rights). Dean Choper's theory is sound when applied to the
war powers context because war powers issues (as this article contends) must be resolved in the political
branches. Although beyond the scope of this article, Dean Choper's theory is more problematic when
applied to other structural constitutional questions (such as federalism), where the answer to those
disputes is not committed to the political branches by the Constitution.
245. See Pushaw, supra note 204, at 451-52 (explaining the relationship between the justiciability
doctrine and the separation of powers).
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branches, which have an independent, indeed critical, duty to consider prudently the
Constitution's meaning.2' After all, though many view courts as having primary
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, one must not confuse primacy with
exclusivity. Even Marbury does not, by its terms, preclude constitutional decision-
making in the legislative and executive departments. So long as political actors do
not perform a judicial power that is solely within the province of Article III
institutions, the Constitution permits the doing of constitutional law in the political
branches, too.
77
Members of Congress begin their term in office by taking an oath to "support and
defend the Constitution,"' an oath prescribed by statute and authorized by Article
VI of the Constitution." ' Similarly, every president begins his administration by
taking an oath, for which the Constitution itself provides, to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution."'  By requiring political actors, as well as judges, to take
a solemn oath to defend the Constitution, the Constitution surely imparts some
significant responsibility on the part of these actors to independently consider the
Constitution's meaning.251
If that were not enough, though, the scheme of representation that the
Constitution creates also supports the idea of constitutional deliberation outside the
courts. In Federalist No. 10, Madison reminds us that the representative has a duty
to "refine and enlarge the public view."' n By eschewing the delegation model and
246. See Broughton, Boeme Down the House, supra note 9, at 360-61; Fisher, supra note 14, at 708
("Congress... shares with the executive and the judiciary the duty of constitutional interpretation.");
Hickok, supra note 14, at 218 (arguing that the Framers wanted legislators involved in constitutional
discourse); see also Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 589 (1975) (arguing that Congress "must learn not only to interpret the
Constitution, but also to interpret judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution"); Mark Tushnet,
Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies,
50 DUKE LJ. 1395, 1418 (2001) (arguing that "[c]ontroversies concerning the constitutional allocation
of the power to make war between Congress and the President come close to satisfying the criteria for
evaluation of congressional constitutional interpretation").
247. See Broughton, Boeme Down the House, supra note 9, at 321 (stating Congress may not
"deprive the judiciary of complete control over judicial functions," those committed to the judiciary by
Article III and not otherwise granted to other branches); Katyal, supra note 14, at 1351 ("Congress...
should exert a larger role in bridging the gap between ordinary and higher lawmaking by inserting itself
into interpretive questions and self-consciously trying to find consensus on the abstract value and lessons
of different constitutional moments.").
248. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
249. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
250. Id. art. It, § I.
251. See Entin, supra note 14, at 216 ("Faithfulness to their oath necessarily requires members of
Congress and the President to consider the constitutionality of proposed policies as an important aspect
of performing their duties."); Fisher, supra note 14, at 718-22 ("[Ihe duty and oath to support and
defend the Constitution are not cancelled by claims of institutional incompetence or personal
uncertainty."); Hon. John N. Hostettler & Thomas W. Washburne, The Constitutions Final Interpreter:
We the People, 8 REOENT U. L. REv. 13 (1997) ("The President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court
are all bound by their oaths to uphold the Constitution, and each branch is forced to form an initial
interpretation and then decide whether its proposed actions would be appropriate.").
252. THE FEDERALUST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
[Vol. 54:685
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss4/2
WAR POWER: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
favoring the representation model, Madison recognized that sound representative
government required the exercise of independent judgment by legislators who would
be part of a deliberative institution, motivated by the public good, and moderated
by the forces of competing interests." That judgment included deliberation upon
the Constitution generally, and upon structural constitutional issues specifically z'
Indeed, as we have seen, such structural constitutional deliberation could also exist
in court- or judge-like form, as when the Congress "declares" war or when the
Senate conducts trials on impeachment. Historical practice, moreover, provides a
telling example. Members of the early Congresses deliberated significantly upon the
powers of the executive and judicial branch, and upon the limits of their own
powers." Recall Madison's statement during the early debates on presidential
removal power, "beg[ging] to know, upon what principle it can be contended" that
one branch has greater authority to decide the bounds of constitutional power than
the others.' The legislators also debated the necessity of preserving rights, and
considered the need for (and ultimately adopted) a national Bill of Rights.' These
debates quite rightly reflected the serious task of representation. As Hickok
explains,
Understanding the obligations of representation was the first task of a
member of Congress in 1789, and engaging debate over questions of
constitutional significance was very much a part of achieving that
understanding. Before members could represent the people, they had to
determine, each one for himself, exactly what representation entailed.
Before they could govern the nation, they had to determine, each one
for himself, what governing a nation entailed."
Thus, only by seriously engaging in the process of scrutinizing the Constitution
could Congress, a national assembly governing a single nation, effectuate the
representative government that the Constitution envisions.
253. See id.; see also Edmund Burke, A Letter to John Farrow and John Harris, Esqs., Sheriffs of
the City of Bristol on the Affairs of America 1777, in EDMUND BURKE, SELECrED WRrINGS AND
SPEEcHirs 187 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 1963) (defending the notion of representation, stating that "[y]our
representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you,
if he sacrifices it to your opinion").
254. See Hickok, supra note 14, at 271. Hickok explains,
The debates during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia produced a Congress
in which representation would combine with deliberation to produce responsible
government. The arguments mounted in the Federalist Papers emphasized the degree to
which the national legislature was designed to be a deliberative assembly. When the First
Congress convened, the members argued for a congressional responsibility to interpret the
Constitution. These arguments were for deliberation of a very particular sort: deliberation
on constitutional issues.
Id.
255. See id. at 260-71.
256. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (Joseph Gale ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
257. See, e.g., id. at 368-71 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (concerning the establishment of the
executive departments).
258. Hickok, supra note 14, at 271.
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Text, structure, and history also support executive branch constitutional
deliberation. 9 Presidents from Washington to Clinton have long used the veto
power, as President Nixon did with the War Powers Resolution, to defend
constitutional prerogatives.'n Presidents, moreover, have considered their own
theories of constitutional jurisprudence and meaning when appointing federal judges,
especially because Supreme Court Justices' views of constitutional law are often
scrutinized for conformity with that of the President that appoints them."' Even
exercising authority under the Commander in Chief Clause itself requires
constitutional deliberation, for, as we have seen, many recent presidents have
considered whether the act of deploying troops in the absence of a congressional
authorization was constitutionally appropriate (and concluded that it was).2" These
functions, among others,"6 thus require some degree of serious deliberation by the
259. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267 (1996). Lawson and Moore provide a thorough comparison of
judicial constitutional interpretation and executive constitutional interpretation. They give particular
attention to the textual sources of presidential interpretational authority, including the President's power
to faithfully execute the laws (the Take Care Clause), the pardon power, the veto power, and the
Presentment Clause. Id. at 1279-1312. Lawson and Moore consider how each of these provisions allows
the President to render an independent legal (and constitutional) judgment about legislation and the nature
of his own powers. Id. The authors admit their task is "strictly descriptive rather than prescriptive," and
also conclude that, while our constitutional system is sure to produce "chaos and conflict,'" nevertheless,
"when viewed through the lens of this system, a power of independent presidential review does not seem
so strange or threatening." Id. at 1271, 1330.
260. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L.
REv. 205, 213-20 (1999). Magliocca provides several historical examples of presidential vetoes that were
used for constitutional reasons. For example, President Washington vetoed an apportionment bill because
"he thought [the bill] would violate the constitutional requirement that there be at least one representative
for every thirty thousand people." Id. at 214-15. In addition, Madison used his first two vetoes to reject
legislation that he believed would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 215; see also, e.g., President's
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1929 (Dec. 28, 1995) (explaining President
Clinton's view that the legislation would "infringef. on the President's constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief").
Whether presidents are supposed to use their veto power only to safeguard constitutional powers and
rights - and not merely for political or policy-based reasons - is a question of some import, but one
beyond the scope of this article. See DICLERICO, supra note 40, at 38 (noting the constitutional nature
of President Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution); Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century
Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World, 48 ARK. L. REv. 1, 9 (1995) ("Mhe Framers' principal
goal was to allow the President to veto laws on constitutional, rather than policy, grounds."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the executive veto
power as a means of defending the President against legislative encroachments upon executive power);
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442-43 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the
necessity of the veto to defend executive constitutional authority).
261. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JuSTICis, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS (1999) (providing
a comprehensive account of the appointment process for Supreme Court Justices and referring to the
political and constitutional considerations that attended the nominations).
262. See Bush, supra note 22, at 1747 ("[E]very President since 1973 has insisted that the
Resolution impinged on his constitutional prerogatives and has treated the Resolution with institutional
contempt.").
263. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 259, at 1279-1312.
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President in ascertaining the Constitution's meaning. As with Congress, then,
constitutional deliberation by the President aids immeasurably in the performance
of presidential duties.'
Constitutional history and design, which envision constitutional deliberation in
every branch as a corollary of sound government, have, however, yielded to a
bizarre mindset of judicial exclusivity that lacks constitutional foundation and
distorts republican government. As the role of the federal judiciary in deciding
constitutional questions has expanded, the role of the political branches in engaging
in thoughtful constitutional debate has unfortunately subsided. Presidents, for
example, now often use the veto power for purely political reasons, divorced from
considerations of constitutional structure or rights. Congress, as Judge Mikva has
noted, no longer conducts serious and thoughtful constitutional debate, but rather
"for the most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular
piece of legislation that fits the perceived needs of the moment."'2 This has led
Judge Mikva to conclude that Congress is institutionally incapable of adequately
engaging in constitutional decision making.' Professor Tushnet describes this
phenomenon as the judicial overhang.' Political actors, he asserts, now simply
leave difficult constitutional questions to the courts. The judicial overhang thus
ultimately promotes irresponsibility, distorts legislation, distorts legislative
discussion, and misleads legislators.' Although Professor Tushnet takes the
provocative (but ultimately imprudent) view of replacing judicial review with
majoritarian constitutional interpretation altogether,' the premise of his theory -
264. One question that scholars raise, but that is beyond the scope of this article, is whether, in
connection with the President's interpretational powers, he is authorized to ignore final decisions of the
Supreme Court when he disagrees with the Court. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987) (arguing that the President has direct "access" to the
Constitution and may at times refuse to be bound by the Supreme Court's explication of constitutional
law); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma ofAutonomous Executive Branch
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 81, 86-87 (1993) (characterizing the "competing strand of
constitutional theory" that does not accept judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); Michel
Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy. Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional
Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 173 (1993) (concluding that
"[pireservation of the constitutional order and of fundamental values inherent in constitutionalism require
that there be no absolute power over constitutional interpretation," but that ultimate authority should rest
with the judiciary and "in the executive branch only as an exception under highly unusual circumstan-
ces"); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 113, 116-17
(1993) ("1 am mostly concerned, however, with refuting a particular view that has been asserted by
presidents from time to time... : that the President is sometimes entitled to claim direct access to 'the
Constitution,' unmediated by constitutional law as the courts have developed it"); see also Lawson &
Moore, supra note 259, at 1319 (analyzing the debate over independent presidential review and
presidential authority to review courts' judgments).
265. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L.
REv. 587, 606 (1983).
266. Seeid. at 609-11.
267. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITTION AWAY FROM THE COURTs 57-65 (1999);
Tushnet, supra note 246, at 1419.
268. See TUSHNEr, supra note 267, at 57-65.
269. See id.
270. Id.; see also Robert Justin Lipkin, The New Majoritariansm, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 107 (2000)
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that the constitutional system recognizes a vital role for political branch
constitutional decision making - is persuasive.
Judicial abstention from war powers disputes can mitigate the effects of the
judicial overhang by encouraging Congress and the President to think more seriously
about constitutional structure."' In the Vietnam era, for example, Congress
enacted the War Powers Resolution to assert its own constitutional prerogatives only
after the courts had consistently refused to intervene. Perhaps this was no accident.
Without resort to the judiciary, Congress was forced to take responsibility for using
its Article I powers in its own defense. Whatever the other flaws of the War Powers
Resolution, it at least represents Congress's assertiveness in attempting to define the
boundaries of constitutional war power, as the Constitution provides. (Whether
Congress got it right is a separate matter, beyond the scope of this article.)
Similarly, rather than resort to the courts to challenge the constitutionality of the
Resolution, presidents since Nixon have simply deployed troops at their discretion,
forcing Congress to either authorize the action, reject such authorization, withdraw
funding, or, perhaps as a last resort, impeach the President. Thus, the modem trend
of cases leaving war powers controversies to the political branches has produced
somewhat more responsible political institutions, though much work must still be
done to truly effectuate the Constitution's vision of prudent and reasoned
constitutional discourse among the Congress and the White House.' In keeping
therefore with constitutional history and design, political actors best serve republican
government when they give careful attention to constitutional boundaries and
constitutional weapons in the course of adopting military and foreign policy.
Political actors will be more likely to do so if they have only themselves, and not
the courts, to do the work.
IV. Conclusion
There is much we can learn from Madison and Marshall, statesmen who
understood the value of prudent constitutional reasoning to the practical governance
of a large republic. Importantly, not all such reasoning occurs in the courts, nor
(critiquing Tushnet's theory). Professor Lipkin offers a compelling reply to Tushnet's position, arguing
that Tushnet has failed "to distinguish between constitutional review and judicial review as well as
between judicial review and judicial supremacy." Id. at 108.
271. See Tushnet, supra note 246, at 1419 (noting the "ambiguous status of the judicial overhang"
in war powers controversies but concluding that "[t]he ambiguities generated by [the law of standing]
mean that members of Congress might think that they have judicial review available to them. This
mistaken belief might distort the way in which members consider war-powers questions."). Cf. ELY,
supra note 16, at 56 (arguing that courts should play a greater role in war powers controversies). Dean
Ely urges greater responsibility on the part of Congress in asserting its constitutional prerogatives. He
argues, however, that courts can "induce" Congress to do its job by playing a more aggressive role in
resolving war powers disputes. Id.
272. See Entin, supra note 14, at 226 ("T]he Constitution derives its meaning not only from judicial
interpretation but also from shared understandings that emerge from governance and politics."); Marion,
supra note 207, at 414-17 (encouraging sober and moderate constitutional discourse in the tradition of
Madison and Marshall).
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should it. Those matters not "of a judiciary nature," in Madison's words, must find
resolution in other fora. Controversies between Congress and the President
regarding the Constitution's allocation of war powers are among this class of
disputes. This is not to say that courts must leave all cases involving foreign affairs
to the vicissitudes of political institutions; the Constitution explicitly vests the
judiciary with authority over admiralty and maritime cases, as well as cases
affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, all of which may invariably
touch upon foreign relations. War powers disputes are constitutionally unique,
however, because the Constitution itself commits the resolution of those disputes to
legislators and the chief executive. The courts have, for the most part, appropriately
left these disputes where they belong, in the hands of the political branches.
Through the doctrine of justiciability, courts have helped to preserve the separation
of powers by recognizing both the limits on their Article In authority and the broad
prerogatives that the Constitution grants to political actors who are charged with
making and effecting American military and foreign policy. By continuing this
trend, as the District of Columbia Circuit did in Campbell, the judiciary can
encourage deliberation about constitutional structure in the political branches, as
Madison and Marshall envisioned.
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